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Article 8

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process of L-aw.--Compensating judge out of fine imposed. Plaintiff -inerror-was arrested-, brought before the -village -mayor, and charged with :a
violation of the Ohio Prohibition Act. He made a motion for
dismissal of his case on the grounds that the magistrate -was
disqualified by reason of the fact that under the Ohio Code the
fees and costs of the magistrate were dependent upon the conviction of the accused, in violation of the Due Process clause -of
the Federal Constitution. The motion was denied,; he -was convicted and a fine and imprisonment -pronounced upon -him. 'The
case Tan the gamut of the judiciary in Ohio and was brought to
the U. S. Supreme Court on a writ of error to reverse the deci.sionof the Ohio supreme court, affirming the conviction. Held,
the proceedings were a denial of Due Process of Law because of
the "direct, substantial, pecuniary interest" of -the magistrate
against the accused. Tum ey v. State of Ohio, 47 Sup. Ct. (Adv.
Ops.) 437, 71 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) -508. Chief Justice Taft, delivering the opinion of the court, searches the entire history of
Common law usage and practice in England, from which our
conception of Due Process is derived, -and concludes that "a
system by which an inferior judge is paid for his services only
when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by
iustom in the general practice, either at common law or in this
country, that it can be regarded as -due process of law, unless
the costs usually imposed are so small that they may'be -properly
ignored as within themaxim 'de -minimis non curat lex'
It is inconsistent with American precepts of -a fair and impartial trial, and contrary to our sense of justice-that a judicial or
quasi judicial officer be-permitted tohave any interest, pecuniary
or otherwise, in the outcome of -a case pending before him. Pearce
v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324; Taylor -v. Worcester Co., 105 Mass. 225;
Stockwell v. White Lake, 22 Mich. 341-; Moses v. Ytilan, 45 N. H.
52, 84 Am. Dec. '114; State v. Crane, 36 N. J. Law 394; Nelson v.
State, (Nebr.) 211 N.W. Adv. Ops. 175; Findley v. Smith, 42 W
Va. 299, 26 S. E. 370.
The pecuniary interest and prejudice of the justice, -asan -ndi-
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z'idual, in the instant case was not the only reason for holding the
proceedings unconstitutional. The court also held that there
was a denial of Due Process in the fact that the mayor, trying
the case (without a. jury), and assessing a large fine which was
split between the city and the .state, was acting in a dual capacity
as a judicial and executive officer whose conflicting positions
offered strong inducement while sitting as a judicial officer to
deny the accused a,fair and impartial trial for the sake of the
city coffers. Likewise it was held in State ex. rel. Colcord v. Young,
31 Fla. 594, 12 So. 673, 19 L. R. A. 636, 34 Am. St. Rep. 41, and, in
Boston v. Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315, 1 N. E. 417, that it was a denial
of due process for a judicial officer to hold two inconsistent offices, one partisan and the other judicial.
W. L. T.
CONTRACTS-Enforcement of Illegal Contracts. Plaintiff, the holder of a lottery ticket which bore the winning number,
entrusted the ticket to defendant who presented same- to the
parties in charge and procured the prize, an automobile, which he
refused to deliver to plaintiff when so requested. Defendant
resisted the plaintiff's suit in replevin on the alleged unenforceability of an illegal contract. Held, "The rule that the law will
not enforce an illegal contract has application only as between
the immediate parties to the contract" Matta v. Katsoulas, (Wisc.
1927) 212 N. W. 261.
Although the parties to an illegal contract, cannot invoke
the aid of courts of law or equity in the enforcement of their
agreements the 'defense of illegality is not open to third persons.
Edward Thompson Co. v. Pakulski, 220 Mass. 96, 107 N. E. 412;
Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 40 Am. S. R.
319, 21 L. R. A. 337; Farmers Bank v. Detroit R. R. Co., 17 Wis
372. An action will generally lie to compel an agent to accounl
for money or property received for his principal "although it
was received by the agent as the fruits of an illegal transaction"
Agency 2 C. J. sec. 411. The defendant in the principal case
ought not to be permitted on any theory to take advantage of
an illegal transaction in which he had no active participation.
W. L. T.
DEATH-Recovery by administrator for death of voluntary
victim of abortion. The defendant performed a crude operation
upon plaintiff's intestate causing miscarriage followed by death
resulting from .septicemia, a germ disease induced by the negli-
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gent and unsanitary method of treatment pursued by defendant
in the course of her illegal act. Plaintiff, as admiinistrator,
brought a tort action against defendant for the death and conscious suffering of decedent. Held, the voluntary participation
of deceased in an operation to produce abortion, in violation of
law, bars recovery in an action for her death and suffering.
Sgzadiwicz v. Cantor, (Mass. 1926) 154 N.E. 251.
It is well settled and consonant with sound reason, that one
party to a contract in violation of a criminal statute cannot recover
damages from the other contracting party in an action ex contractus
Myer; v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 368, Am. Rep. 368; Shellenberger v.
Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N, W. 935, 25 L. R. A. 564; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep.
819; Pennington v..Todd, 47 N. J. Eq. 569 21 At. 297, 11 L. R. A.
589, 24 Am. St. Rep. 419; Norbeck v. State, 32 S. D. 189, 142 N. W.
847, Ann. Cas. 1916 A. 229; Kirkpatrick v. Clark, 132 Ill. 342, 24
N. E: 71, 8,L..R. A. 511, 22 Am. St. Rep: 531; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 19 Sup. Ct. 134, 43 L. Ed. 382; 6 R. C. L. 816.
For the same reason an action cannot be maintained on the contract
theory in a case similar to the one under discussion. Hunter V'.
Wheate, 53 App. D. C. (1923) 206, 289 Fed. 604, 31 A. L. R. 980.
In tort actions the general rule may be stated that illegal conduct
and participation of plaintiff in an act of which he complains, if
it be the proximate or conctirring cause of the injury, is a bar to
recovery. Wallace v. Cannon, 38 Ga. 199, 95 Am. Dec. 385; Deeds
v. Strode, 6 Ida. 317, 55 Pac. '656, 96 Am. St' Rep. 263, 43 L. R. A.
207; Toledo R. R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 -11. 80, 28 Am. Rep. 119; Drake
v. Pa.R. R. Co., 137 Pa. St. 352, 20 At. 994, 21 Am. St. Rep. 883;
Miller v. Lamery, 62 Vt. 116, 20 Atl. 199; Hiller v. Ladd, 85 Fed.
703. Ordinarily consent to an act resulting in harm is not a basis
for a civil action. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Allen, 39 Ill, 205; Fitz.geraldv. Cavin, 110 Mass. 153; Markley v. Whitman, 95 Mich. 236,
54 N. W. 763, 35 Am. St. Rep. 558, 20 L. R. A. 55; Coldnamer v.
O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S, W. 831, 36 L. PR A. (N. S.) 862; Levy
v. Kansas City, 168 Fed. 525 22 L. R. A. 862. But thid rule does
not apply to acts detrimental to life, or constituting a commission of
a crime or breach of peace. Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531, 5
Am. Rep. 230; Grotton v. Glidden, 84 Me. 589, 24 At. 1008, 30 Am.
St. Rep. 413; Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, 20 Am.
-.
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Rep. 328; Stout v. Wren, 8 N .C. 420, 9. Am. Dec. 653; Milliken v.
Heddesheimer (infra), Shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540, 18 N. W.
473, 48 Am. Rep. 538;'1 Cooley, "Torts", 3d. ed. p. 282. There
are few cases in the books involving the law and facts of the
principal case; and no case can be found strictly on all fours,
establishing a precedent for the decision of the Massachusetts
court; but a similar rule has been applied by other courts to
similar facts from which the inference might be drawn that they
are in accord. However, 'there is a difference in facts lending
opportunity for a distinction to be made. In Coidnamer v. O'Brien,
supra, recovery was denied but the action was against parties, who
were not responsible for her condition, for inducing plaintiff to
submit to an abortion operation. In Hunter v. Wheate, supra, the
husband consented to and participated in the preparation and consultation preliminary to the commission of the illegal act. In direct
conflict with the tenor of these cases are; Milliken v. Heddesheimer,
(Ohio 1924) 144 N. E. 264, 33 A. L. R. 53; Miller v. Bayer, 94
Wisc. 123, 68 N. W. 869; Lembo v.Donnell, (1917) 116 Me. 505,
101 AtI. 469.
Of course the nature and extent of the right of action fbr
death is defined and limied by the statute creating it, but under
the common statute the weight of authority and better reason
casts its favor toward the right of recovery for the death of a
voluntary victim of abortion. Consent of the deceased should
not be a bar to the action for *Wrongful death becduse it is
founded on a right distinct from any that may have been in the
victim. Consent as a defense should only apply between the
immediate parties and participants in the act producing abortion.
The kin of the decedent should not be barred from recovery in
their right by a shield placed around the one who perpetrated the
illegal act. The Massachusetts court excused itself on the
grounds of public policy but even from that standpoint its ruling
is dangerous because it will tend to increase abortions by permitting malpractice scoundrels to go about their unholy business
protected by a rule of law saving them harmless from all financial responsibilities.
W. L. T.
DIVORCE-Association of spouse with one of opposite sex
as consituting cruel and inhuman treatment. The husband by
a cross bill demanded a divorce on the ground of cruel and in-
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human treatment, which consisted of association by his wife
with a certain man against the protests of the husband who had
found them together under suspicious circumstances and had
forbidden her to continue her intimate relations with him. The
wife, in defiance of her husband's protestations, refused to give
up the society of the other man and her husband ordered her out
of the house. After she left her husband, she resided at several
places to which the other man constantly repaired to continue
his attentions towards her. Adultery was neither alleged nor
proved. It was contended on behalf of the wife that since
adultery did not constitute "cruel and inhuman treatment", then
suspicion of adulterous conduct and the mental anguish accompanying such suspicion could not; but the court held that the
wife's continued association against the protests of her husband
was so "cogent and persuasive of wrongdoing" that it amounted
to cruel and inhuman treatment within the statutory ground for
divorce. Tschida v. Tschida (Minn. 1927) 212 N. W. 193.
Cruel and inhuman treatment was first designated as a
ground for divorce to relieve an innocent spouse from further
danger of maltreatment to life or health. At first it was confined to cases of physical punishment; later it was recognized
by the courts that mental distress was just as derogatory to life
and health as physical suffering; now it is quite generally admitted that mental anguish resulting from wrongful conduct
amounts to cruel and inhuman treatment. "Divorce" 19 C. J.
sec. 88, citing cases. Mental suffering equivalent to cruel and
inhuman treatment must. be such that it is an impairment, or
serious enough to cause a reasonable fear of resulting injury, to
life or health. Andrews v. Andrews, 120 Calif. 184, 52 Pac. 298
(false charge of insanity); Driver v. Driver, (Ind.) 52 N. E. 401
(imputations of either ante, or post, nuptial unchastity) ; McClintock
v. McClintock 147 Ky. 409, 144 S. W. 68, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1127
(indifference, neglect, annoyance and humiliation); Weigel v.
Weigel, (N. J.) 47 Ati. 183 (mental suffering caused by abuse);
Whitehead v. Whitehead (N. H.) 79 AUt. 516 (knowledge of other's
infidelity) ; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 102 N. E. 389
(insinuations of theft and adultery); Marks v. Marks (Minn.) 64
N. W.. 561, 45 Am. St. Rep. 466, (scolding, abusive language);
Craigv. Craig 129 Ia. 192, 105 N. W. 446, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 669,
(manifestation of love for another.)

